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1 Introduction
The probabilistic values form a wide family of solutions for cooperative games. These
values introduced by Weber [12] evolve from a probabilistic payoff process where each
of the players possesses a probabilistic distribution over the coalitions he is member
of. If according to this distribution a coalition is chosen then the payoff to the
player is the marginal contribution of that player to the chosen coalition. Thus, the
corresponding probabilistic value is obtained as the expected payoff of the players.
A particular type of probabilistic values are the semivalues, introduced and ax-
iomatically characterized by Dubey et al. [5]. Now the probabilistic distributions
only depend on the coalition size and coincide for all players. The semivalues repre-
sent a natural generalization of both important solution concepts, the Shapley value
[11] and the Banzhaf value [2, 8].
The main objective of this work consists of constructing solutions based on mar-
ginal contributions for games with structure of coalition blocks. These blocks formed
in the set of players can be economic, political or social groups of agents with affinities
or common interests. The coalition blocks act as one unit in a first bargaining
process. Later, a new bargaining process occurs among the members of each block.
The introduced solutions are modifications of the semivalues for situations with
coalition structure. Here, two semivalues are used at two different levels: a first
semivalue among the coalition blocks considered as players in a modified quotient
game and a second semivalue among the players of each coalition block. According
to their construction, these solutions are called mixed modified semivalues.
In addition, we offer a computation procedure for the mixed modified semivalues
based on suitable modifications of the Owen’s multilinear extension [7] and a product
of matrices. For this computation we use reference systems of semivalues and we
consider a particular type of semivalues whose allocations can be easy obtained from
the multilinear extension of each game.
The organization of the paper is as follows. After a preliminary Section 2 devoted
to cooperative games and semivalues, in Section 3 we introduce reference systems for
semivalues and we compute allocations by semivalues to all players of a given game
by means of a product of matrices. This section contains notations and procedures
that are tools to reach the central objective of this work and it allows us to offer a
self-contained paper. Section 4 provides the general method to construct the wide
family of mixed modified semivalues for games with coalition structure, whereas
Section 5 offers a computation procedure for this family of solutions. Finally, in
Section 6, a generalization of these solutions is proposed.
2 Cooperative games and semivalues
A cooperative game with transferable utility is a pair (N, v), where N is a finite set
of players and v : 2N → R is the so-called characteristic function, which assigns to
every coalition S ⊆ N a real number v(S), the worth of coalition S, and satisfies
the natural condition v(∅) = 0. A game v is monotonic if v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever
S ⊆ T ⊆ N . A player i ∈ N is a dummy in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}) for all
S ⊆ N \ {i}. Two players i, j ∈ N are symmetric in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for
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all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
From now on we suppose N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and we denote with GN the set of all
cooperative games on N . For a given set of players N , we identify each game (N, v)
with its characteristic function v.
A solution on the set of cooperative games GN is an allocation rule that as-
signs a payoff to each game player, i.e., a function Ψ : GN → R
N , where Ψ[v] =
(Ψ1[v], . . . ,Ψn[v]). It represents a method to measure the negotiation strength of
the players in the game. The payoff vector space RN is also called the allocation
space.
In order to calibrate the importance of each player i in the different coalitions S,
we can look at his/her marginal contribution v(S) − v(S \ {i}). If these marginal
contributions are weighted by means of coefficients depending only on the coalition
size, we arrive at the solution concept known as semivalue.
The semivalues were introduced and axiomatically characterized in Dubey et al.
[5]. These solutions are characterized by means of four axioms:
A1. Additivity. Ψ[u+ v] = Ψ[u] + Ψ[v] ∀u, v ∈ GN .
A2. Symmetry. Ψpii[piv] = Ψi[v] ∀v ∈ GN , ∀i ∈ N, ∀pi permutation of N , where
game piv is defined by (piv)(piS) = v(S) ∀S ⊆ N .
A3. Positivity. Game v monotonic implies Ψi[v] ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N.
A4. Projection. Ψi[v] = v({i}) ∀v ∈ AN , where AN denotes the set of additive
games in GN : games v such that v(S ∪ T ) = v(S) + v(T ) if S ∩ T = ∅ and
S, T ⊆ N.
Theorem 2.1 (Dubey et al., 1981 [5]) (a) Every weighting vector (p1, p2, . . . , pn)
verifying conditions
n∑
s=1
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
ps = 1 and ps ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ s ≤ n (1)
defines a semivalue ψ : GN → R
N whose allocations are given by
ψi[v] =
∑
S⊆N : i∈S
ps[v(S)− v(S \ {i})] ∀i ∈ N (where s = |S|).
(b) Conversely, every semivalue defined on GN is of this form, so that, there exists
a one-to-one map between the semivalues on GN and the vectors (ps)
n
s=1 that verify
conditions (1).
The number of coalitions of size s that contain a player i ∈ N is
(
n−1
s−1
)
. Conditions
(1) give a probability distribution on the set of these coalitions, assuming equal
weight for equal size. With Sem(GN ) we denote the set of all semivalues defined on
GN .
Well known solutions like the Shapley value [11] and the Banzhaf value [2, 8] are
semivalues. In the case of the Banzhaf value each marginal contribution has an
equal weight, namely 1/2n−1, whereas in the case of the Shapley value, all marginal
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contributions to coalitions with a same size have an equal weight, i.e., 1/[n
(
n−1
s−1
)
]
for 1 ≤ s ≤ n.
Definition 2.2 A semivalue on GN is called binomial semivalue if its weighting
coefficients are in geometric progression.
We assume ps+1 = kps for 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1 and k > 0. Every positive number can
be written as k = α/(1−α) with 0 < α < 1, so that the first condition in (1) allows
us to determine a parametric expression for the weighting coefficients:
1 =
n∑
s=1
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
ps = p1
n∑
s=1
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
ks−1 = p1[1 + k]
n−1 ⇒ p1 = (1− α)
n−1
and ps = α
s−1(1− α)n−s for 2 ≤ s ≤ n.
The binomial semivalues are related with the numbers α ∈ (0, 1). Given a number
α ∈ R, 0 < α < 1, we call α-binomial semivalue ψα to the semivalue on GN whose
weighting coefficients are
pα,s=α
s−1(1−α)n−s for 1 ≤ s ≤ n.
The extreme cases of binomial semivalues correspond to values α = 0 and α = 1.
For α = 0 we obtain the dictatorial index ψ0, with coefficients (1, 0, ..., 0), whereas for
α = 1 we obtain the marginal index ψ1, with coefficients (0, ..., 0, 1). The respective
allocations are
(ψ0)i[v] = v({i}) ∀i ∈ N and (ψ1)i[v] = v(N)− v(N \ {i}) ∀i ∈ N.
The Banzhaf value is the binomial semivalue for α = 1/2.
3 Reference systems for semivalues
In this Section, since there exists a one-to-one map between semivalues and weight-
ing vectors, we introduce a concept of reference system for semivalues related with
reference systems for weighting vectors in a geometric sense. Then, the computation
of allocations by any semivalue reduces to computations by semivalues belonging to
a reference system. We will prove that n different binomial semivalues form a refer-
ence system for semivalues on cooperative games with n players and their allocations
can be easily obtained.
Definition 3.1 The family of semivalues on GN {ψj}
n
j=1, with respective weighting
coefficients (pj,s)
n
s=1, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, forms a reference system of Sem(GN ) if, and only
if, the family of points
{Pj (pj,s)
n
s=1}
n
j=1
forms a reference system of the hyperplane of Rn with equation
∑n
s=1
(
n−1
s−1
)
ps = 1.
Proposition 3.2 ([6], [1]) For n > 1, given n real numbers αj ∈ [0, 1], such that
αj 6= αk if j 6= k, the family of binomial semivalues {ψαj}
n
j=1 forms a reference
system of Sem(GN ) (n = |N |).
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Proof We denote by Pj the point corresponding to the weighting coefficients of
semivalue ψαj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n. According to Definition 3.1, we should prove that {Pj}
n
j=1
forms a reference system; taking P1 as origin point and Pj , 2 ≤ j ≤ n as unit points,
we should prove that the family {
−−−→
P1Pj}
n
j=2 forms a basis of the hyperplane direction.
It is enough to verify that this family is linearly independent.
In order to assure this last condition, it suffices to prove that the family {
−−→
OPj}
n
j=1
is linearly independent, where O denotes the origin of coordinates. Indeed, we can
write
n∑
j=2
βj
−−−→
P1Pj =
n∑
j=2
βj(
−−→
OPj −
−−→
OP1) =
(
−
n∑
j=2
βj
)−−→
OP1 +
n∑
j=2
βj
−−→
OPj =
−→
0 .
The linear independence of {
−−→
OPj}
n
j=1 implies −
∑n
j=2 βj = β2 = · · · = βn = 0
and, in particular, β2 = · · · = βn = 0, which implies the linear independence of
{
−−−→
P1Pj}
n
j=2.
We denote by ∆ the determinant of the matrix whose columns are the components
of the vectors
−−→
OP1, . . . ,
−−→
OPn,
∆ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1− α1)
n−1 (1− α2)
n−1 · · · (1− αn)
n−1
α1(1− α1)
n−2 α2(1− α2)
n−2 · · · αn(1− αn)
n−2
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
αn−21 (1− α1) α
n−2
2 (1− α2) · · · α
n−2
n (1− αn)
αn−11 α
n−1
2 · · · α
n−1
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
If αj 6= 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have
∆ = (1− α1)
n−1(1− α2)
n−1 · · · (1− αn)
n−1
∏
1≤j<k≤n
[ αk
1− αk
−
αj
1− αj
]
= (1− α1)
n−1(1− α2)
n−1 · · · (1− αn)
n−1
∏
1≤j<k≤n
αk − αj
(1− αk)(1− αj)
=
∏
1≤j<k≤n
(αk − αj)
Since αj 6= αk if j 6= k, ∆ 6= 0 from which the linear independence follows.
If, for instance, αn = 1, the last column is (0, . . . , 0, 1). We can compute ∆
developing by this column and we obtain a similar determinant as in the above
cases. 
Remark 3.3 According to Proposition 3.2, once we have fixed a reference system
of binomial semivalues {ψαj}
n
j=1 in Sem(GN ), for each semivalue ψ defined on GN
there exists a unique family of real numbers λj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, such that
ψ =
n∑
j=1
λjψαj with
n∑
j=1
λj = 1.
The components of semivalue ψ in the reference system {ψαj}
n
j=1 are grouped
according to the following notation:
Λt = (λ1 λ2 · · · λn). (2)
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Definition 3.4 (Owen, 1972 [7]) The multilinear extension (MLE, in the sequel)
of a game v ∈ GN is the function fv : [0, 1]
n −→ R defined by
fv(x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
∑
S⊆N
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
j∈N\S
(1− xj)v(S), (3)
It is known that the allocations according to the Shapley value Sh can be com-
puted from the MLE of each game [7]:
Shi[v] =
∫ 1
0
∂fv
∂xi
(t, t, . . . , t)dt ∀i ∈ N, ∀v ∈ GN ,
and, also, according to the Banzhaf value Bh [8]:
Bhi[v] =
∂fv
∂xi
(1/2, 1/2, . . . , 1/2) ∀i ∈ N, ∀v ∈ GN .
Now, we would generalize these results to all semivalues.
Theorem 3.5 ([6], [1]) Let fv = fv(x1, x2, . . . , xn) be the MLE of game v ∈ GN .
(a) The payoff vector that the binomial semivalue ψα assigns to the players of
game v ∈ GN is
ψα[v] = ∇fv(α) ∀α ∈ [0, 1] where α = (α, . . . , α).
(b) The payoff vector that every semivalue ψ assigns to the players of game v ∈ GN
is
ψ[v] = B Λ
where the matrix B = ( bij ) depends on each reference system of semivalues
{ψαj}
n
j=1,
bij = (ψαj )i[v] =
∂fv
∂xi
(αj), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
and Λ is the matrix of the components of ψ in the reference system (as in (2)).
Proof (a) In the expression (3) of the MLE of game v ∈ GN , we separate terms
according to whether coalitions S contain or not player i ∈ N and we compute the
partial derivative with respect to variable xi.
fv(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
S⊆N : i∈S
xi
∏
j∈S\{i}
xj
∏
k∈N\S
(1− xk)v(S)
+
∑
S⊆N : i6∈S
(1− xi)
∏
j∈S
xj
∏
k∈N\(S∪{i})
(1− xk)v(S);
∂fv
∂xi
(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
S⊆N : i∈S
∏
j∈S\{i}
xj
∏
k∈N\S
(1− xk)v(S)
−
∑
S⊆N : i6∈S
∏
j∈S
xj
∏
k∈N\(S∪{i})
(1− xk)v(S);
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Replacing the variables by α for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, if α = (α, . . . , α), we obtain
∂fv
∂xi
(α) =
∑
S⊆N : i∈S
αs−1(1− α)n−sv(S)−
∑
S⊆N : i6∈S
αs(1− α)n−s−1v(S)
=
∑
S⊆N : i∈S
αs−1(1− α)n−sv(S)−
∑
S⊆N : i∈S
αs−1(1− α)n−sv(S \ {i})
=
∑
S⊆N : i∈S
αs−1(1− α)n−s[v(S)− v(S \ {i})] =
(
ψα
)
i
[v].
(b) We consider a reference system of binomial semivalues {ψαj}
n
j=1 in Sem(GN ).
According to Remark 3.3, given a semivalue ψ on GN , for every game v ∈ GN and
every player i ∈ N we have
ψi[v] =
( n∑
j=1
λjψαj
)
i
[v] =
n∑
j=1
λj
(
ψαj
)
i
[v] =
n∑
j=1
λj
∂fv
∂xi
(αj),
where fv = fv(x1, . . . , xn) is the MLE of game v. It suffices to identify each term
with the elements of the matrices that have been defined, and hence we conclude
that the expression in the statement follows. 
Once a reference system of semivalues is chosen, a matrix summarizes the payoffs
by any semivalue to all players of a given game.
Example 3.6 Four stores have a common supplier and obtain discounts according
to its record of purchases. By performing joint orders, they can reach the discounts
detailed in the following function v:
v({1}) = 2, v({2}) = v({3}) = v({4}) = 1, v({1, 2}) = 5, v({1, 3}) = v({1, 4}) = 4,
v({2, 3}) = v({2, 4}) = 3, v({3, 4}) = 2, v{1, 2, 3} = 7, v{1, 2, 4} = v{1, 3, 4} = 6,
v{2, 3, 4} = 5 and v{1, 2, 3, 4} = 9.
The four stores decide to act together –cooperation– and obtain the common
discount: 9 %. Nevertheless, the stores are competitors in a same market. The
problem consists in how to distribute these 9 units of utility among them.
The MLE of game v is
fv(x1, x2, x3, x4) = 2x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + 2x1x2 + x1x3 + x1x4 + x2x3 + x2x4
− x1x2x3 − 2x1x2x4 + x1x2x3x4
from which
∇fv(α) = (2+4α−3α
2+α3, 1+4α−3α2+α3, 1+2α−α2+α3, 1+2α−2α2+α3).
If we choose as reference system the α-binomial semivalues for values α = 0, 1/3,
2/3 and 1, the matrix that summarizes the action of all the semivalues on 4-person
games for game v is
B =

2 82/27 98/27 4
1 55/27 71/27 3
1 43/27 59/27 3
1 40/27 47/27 2

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The Shapley value (w. coefficients p1 = 1/4, p2 = 1/12, p3 = 1/12, p4 = 1/4) in
the reference system {ψ0, ψ1/3, ψ2/3, ψ1} is
Sh =
1
8
ψ0 +
3
8
ψ1/3 +
3
8
ψ2/3 +
1
8
ψ1
so that Λt = (1/8 3/8 3/8 1/8) and the allocation to the players of game v
according to the Shapley value is
Sh[v] = B Λ =

13/4
9/4
23/12
19/12
 .
A solution concept Ψ : GN → R
N verifies efficiency if the sum of allocations to
the players agrees with the utility obtained by the grand coalition:∑
i∈N
Ψi[v] = v(N) ∀v ∈ GN .
It is known that the Shapley value is the unique efficient semivalue. Thus, the
utility distribution equals the allocation.
Shapley value −→ (3.25, 2.25, 1.92, 1.58)
On the other hand, if we consider, for instance, the binomial semivalue ψ1/3 (w.
coefficients p1 = 8/27, p2 = 4/27, p3 = 2/27, p4 = 1/27), the allocation to the
players in game v corresponds with the second column of matrix B. Since ψ1/3 is
not efficient, the distribution of the total utility is obtained proportionally to the
allocation, 82 : 55 : 43 : 40.
1/3-binomial semivalue −→ (3.35, 2.25, 1.76, 1.64)
4 Mixed modified semivalues
From now on, given a semivalue, a superscript will denote the number of players in
the cooperative games: n = |N | for games in GN .
Definition 4.1 Let ψn be a semivalue on GN with weighting coefficients (p
n
s )
n
s=1.
The family of induced semivalues by ψn on sets of games with less than n players is
{ψm ∈ Sem(GM ) with 1 ≤ m ≤ n and m = |M | },
where the respective weighting coefficients are recursively obtained according to the
Pascal triangle (inverse) formula
pms = p
m+1
s + p
m+1
s+1 1 ≤ s ≤ m < n. (4)
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We can find the above definition in Dragan (1999) [4]. By convenience, we have
included the initial semivalue in its induced family. It is not difficult to see that
the induced semivalues of the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value or, in general, the
α-binomial semivalues are of the same initial types.
Shapley value: pm+1s + p
m+1
s+1 =
1
(m+ 1)
(
m
s−1
) + 1
(m+ 1)
(
m
s
) = 1
m
(
m−1
s−1
) = pms ;
α-binomial semivalues:
pm+1s + p
m+1
s+1 = α
s−1(1− α)m+1−s + αs(1− α)m−s = αs−1(1− α)m−s = pms .
By applying expression (4) successively, the weighting coefficients of any induced
semivalue ψm become
pms =
n−m∑
j=0
(
n−m
j
)
pns+j for 1 ≤ s ≤ m < n. (5)
Proposition 4.2 Let {ψnαj}
n
j=1 be a reference system of binomial semivalues in
Sem(GN ).
If ψn ∈ Sem(GN ) is ψ
n =
n∑
j=1
λjψ
n
αj , then ψ
t =
n∑
j=1
λjψ
t
αj for 1 ≤ t < n.
Proof Let us assume that (pns )
n
s=1 are the weighting coefficients of semivalue
ψn ∈ Sem(GN ). We write these coefficients based on the coefficients of the binomial
semivalues {ψnαj}, 1 ≤ j ≤ n:
pns =
n∑
j=1
λjp
n
αj ,s =
n∑
j=1
λjα
s−1
j (1− αj)
n−s for 1 ≤ s ≤ n.
In the equalities from s = 1 to s = n− 1, we separate a factor of type (1− αj),
pns =
n∑
j=1
λj(1− αj)α
s−1
j (1− αj)
n−s−1, 1 ≤ s ≤ n− 1,
pns +
n∑
j=1
λjα
s
j(1− αj)
n−(s+1) =
n∑
j=1
λjα
s−1
j (1− αj)
n−1−s, 1 ≤ s ≤ n− 1,
from which
pns + p
n
s+1 = p
n−1
s =
n∑
j=1
λjα
s−1
j (1− αj)
n−1−s for 1 ≤ s ≤ n− 1.
We have checked the property for level t = n−1. By induction, it is easy to prove
the statement for the remaining levels, t = n− 2, . . . , 1. 
Remark 4.3 According to Proposition 4.2, the relative position of each semivalue
with respect to a reference system of binomial semivalues remains the same for all
its induced semivalues.
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Thus, there are two possibilities to obtain the weighting coefficients of induced
semivalues: (i) successively from the weighting coefficients of the initial semivalue
by using the Pascal triangle formula (4) and (ii) by means of the coordinates in a
reference system of binomial semivalues by using the weighting coefficients of induced
binomial semivalues.
Let us consider cooperative games v defined on a given finite set of players N .
We suppose that several groups of players with affinities or common interests act
together and form a priori coalition blocks. We want to obtain allocation rules based
on marginal contributions for games with structure of a priori coalition blocks.
Definition 4.4 A structure of coalition blocks in the player set is a partition of N ,
B = {B1, . . . , Bm}. With BN we denote the set of all coalition structures defined in
N . A solution for cooperative games with coalition structure is a function Ψ : GN ×
BN → R
N that assigns a payoff to each player, Ψ[v;B] = (Ψ1[v;B], . . . ,Ψn[v;B]).
Let us suppose that two semivalues ψn and ϕn are defined on games with n players
(eventually ϕn = ψn). The consideration of induced semivalues allows us to define
a concept of mixed modified semivalue for games with coalition structure following
a similar process to the one used by Owen to derive the coalition value [9] from the
Shapley value [11] or the modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure
[10] from the Banzhaf value [2, 8].
Let v be a cooperative game on N . Given a coalition structure B = {B1, . . . , Bm},
we denote by M the set of classes in N given by the coalition structure B. For each
subset K ⊆ Bj , we define a modified quotient game
uBj |K(L) = v
( ⋃
l∈L
Bl \K
′
)
∀L ⊆M,
where K ′ = Bj \ K. This is the game played by the partition classes with the
exception of Bj , that is replaced by the subsetK. Given a semivalue ψ
n ∈ Sem(GN ),
since the game uBj |K is defined on a set M with m players (1 ≤ m ≤ n), we can
apply the induced semivalue ψm:
wj(K) = (ψ
m)j [uBj |K ] ∀K ⊆ Bj . (6)
The value wj(K) shows the strategic position of the subset K ⊆ Bj if this subset
directly negotiate with the other classes as players in the quotient game –according
to the semivalue ψn– in absence of K ′ = Bj \K.
Next, since the game wj is defined on Bj , a set with bj = |Bj | players (1 ≤ bj ≤ n),
we can apply the induced semivalue ϕbj and we define the mixed semivalue ψn/ϕn
modified by the coalition structure B as(
ψn/ϕn
)
i
[v;B] = (ϕbj )i[wj ] ∀i ∈ Bj .
The semivalue ψn has acted among the coalition blocks whereas the distribution
among the players of Bj is obtained according to the semivalue induced by ϕ
n.
The next result offers an explicit expression for the allocations according to mixed
modified semivalues.
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Theorem 4.5 Let v be a game on N and let ψn, ϕn be two semivalues defined
on GN with respective weighting coefficients (p
n
s )
n
s=1 and (q
n
s )
n
s=1. Given a coalition
structure B = {B1, B2, ..., Bm}, the payoff to every player i in a coalition block
Bj ∈ B according to the mixed semivalue ψ
n/ϕn modified by B is(
ψn/ϕn
)
i
[v;B] =
∑
S⊆Bj\{i}
∑
T⊆M\{j}
q
bj
s+1 p
m
t+1
[
v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪ S ∪ {i}
)
− v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪ S
)]
,
(7)
where pmt+1 =
∑n−m
h=0
(
n−m
h
)
pnt+1+h (t = |T |) and q
bj
s+1 =
∑n−bj
h=0
(n−bj
h
)
qns+1+h (s =
|S|).
Proof We first determine the game wj to obtain the explicit formula for the
modified semivalue. According to expression (6), for each K ⊆ Bj we have
wj(K) =
∑
L⊆M : j∈L
pml
[
uBj |K(L)− uBj |K(L \ {j})
]
=
∑
L⊆M : j∈L
pml
[
v
( ⋃
l∗∈L
Bl∗ \K
′
)
− v
( ⋃
l∗∈L\{j}
Bl∗ \K
′
)]
,
where K ′ = Bj \K. If we write L = T ∪{j} with j 6∈ T , then l = t+1 and therefore
wj(K) =
∑
T⊆M : j 6∈T
pmt+1
[
v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪K
)
− v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′
)]
.
The mixed modified semivalue is obtained from game wj . For every player i in
block Bj ,(
ψn/ϕn
)
i
[v;B] = (ϕbj )i[wj ] =
∑
S′⊆Bj : i∈S′
q
bj
s′
[
wj(S
′)− wj(S
′ \ {i})
]
.
Writing S′ = S ∪ {i} with i 6∈ S, the last equality becomes(
ψn/ϕn
)
i
[v;B] =
∑
S⊆Bj : i6∈S
q
bj
s+1
[
wj(S ∪ {i})− wj(S)
]
.
If in this formula we replace wj(S ∪{i}) and wj(S) with the expressions obtained
from wj(K), then, for i ∈ Bj ,
(
ψn/ϕn
)
i
[v;B] =
∑
S⊆Bj : i6∈S
q
bj
s+1
[ ∑
T⊆M : j 6∈T
pmt+1
[
v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪ S ∪ {i}
)
− v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪ S
)]]
=
∑
S⊆Bj\{i}
∑
T⊆M\{j}
q
bj
s+1p
m
t+1
[
v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪ S ∪ {i}
)
− v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪ S
)]
.
The coefficients pmt+1 are weighting coefficients of the induced semivalue ψ
m whereas
the coefficients q
bj
s+1 correspond to the induced semivalue ψ
bj ; their respective ex-
pressions directly follow from formula (5). 
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Corollary 4.6 If the semivalues are, respectively, α and β binomial semivalues, we
denote the mixed modified semivalue ψnα/ψ
n
β with the more compact notation ψ
α
β .
Then, ∀i ∈ Bj
(ψαβ )i[v;B] =
∑
S⊆Bj\{i}
∑
T⊆M\{j}
βs(1− β)bj−s−1αt(1− α)m−t−1
[
v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪ S ∪ {i}
)
− v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪ S
)]
. 
Several properties of the solution concept for games with coalition structure here
introduced are now detailed.
Proposition 4.7 Let ψn and ϕn be two semivalues defined on cooperative games
with set of players N . Let BN be the set of all coalition structures defined in N . The
mixed modified semivalue ψn/ϕn verifies:
(a) ψn/ϕn[u+ v;B] = ψn/ϕn[u;B] + ψn/ϕn[v;B] ∀u, v ∈ GN , ∀B ∈ BN .
(b) If game v ∈ GN is monotonic, then
(
ψn/ϕn
)
i
[v;B] ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, ∀B ∈ BN .
(c) If player i ∈ N is a dummy in game v ∈ GN , then
(
ψn/ϕn
)
i
[v;B] = v({i}) ∀B ∈
BN .
(d) If v(S ∪{i1}) ≥ v(S ∪{i2}) ∀S ⊆ N \ {i1, i2}, with i1, i2 ∈ Bj and Bj coalition
block of B, then
(
ψn/ϕn
)
i1
[v;B] ≥
(
ψn/ϕn
)
i2
[v;B].
(e) In case of coalition structure NI = {{1}, {2}, . . . , {n}} (individual blocks),
ψn/ϕn[v;NI ] = ψ
n[v] ∀v ∈ GN .
(f) In case of coalition structure {N} = {{1, 2, . . . , n}} (grand coalition),
ψn/ϕn[v; {N}] = ϕn[v] ∀v ∈ GN .
Proof All sections of the statement can be easily checked. We only prove section
(c). If player i ∈ N is a dummy in game v ∈ GN , v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}) for all
S ⊆ N \ {i}, and therefore(
ψn/ϕn
)
i
[v;B] =
∑
S⊆Bj\{i}
∑
T⊆M\{j}
q
bj
s+1 p
m
t+1v({i}).
Since pmt+1 and q
bj
s+1 are weighting coefficients of induced semivalues,
∑
T⊆M\{j}
pmt+1 =
m−1∑
t=0
(
m− 1
t
)
pmt+1 = 1 and
∑
S⊆Bj\{i}
q
bj
s+1 =
bj−1∑
s=0
(
bj − 1
s
)
q
bj
s+1 = 1,
from which
(
ψn/ϕn
)
i
[v;B] = v({i}). 
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5 Computation procedure of mixed modified semivalues
According to Section 3, the multilinear extension (MLE) of a game has been an ad-
equate tool to compute allocations according to all semivalues by means of reference
systems of binomial semivalues. Now, we want to offer a similar procedure for the
mixed modified semivalues. For it, we need a modified MLE for each coalition block
obtained from the MLE of the initial game.
Definition 5.1 Let B = {B1, . . . , Bm} be a coalition structure in N and let M =
{1, . . . ,m} be the set of classes in N according to the coalition structure B. From the
MLE fv of game v, a modified multilinear extension for each coalition block Bj ∈ B
can be obtained by means of the following rules:
(1) For each t ∈M , t 6= j, and each u ∈ Bt replace in fv the variable xu with yt.
(2) In the above function, reduce all exponents that appear in yt to 1, i.e., replace
yrt (r > 1) with yt, obtaining another MLE
fv,j(xk, yt) k ∈ Bj and t ∈M \ {j}
Remark 5.2 The rule (2) provides a linear function in the variables yt, t ∈M \{j},
when yrt (r > 1) is replaced with yt. We find this procedure for obtaining a modi-
fied multilinear extension in [3], where a computation for the Banzhaf solution for
games with coalition structure is offered. Now, we will use each modified multilinear
extension fv,j for obtaining allocations by mixed modified semivalues to the players
of block Bj .
Theorem 5.3 Let us assume that {ψnαk}
n
k=1 is a reference system of binomial semi-
values in Sem(GN ). If v is a cooperative game on N , ψ
n and ϕn are two semivalues
on GN with respective expressions
ψn =
n∑
k=1
λkψ
n
αk
ϕn =
n∑
l=1
λ˜lψ
n
αl
and B = {B1, . . . , Bm} is a structure of coalition blocks defined in N , then the
allocation for each player i in block Bj according to the modified solution ψ
n/ϕn can
be computed by means of the following expression
(ψn/ϕn)i[v;B] = Λ
tA(i) Λ˜, (8)
where the matrix A(i) = ( akl(i) ) depends on the reference system of Sem(GN ) and
can be obtained from the MLE of block Bj
akl(i) = (ψ
αk
αl
)i[v;B] =
∂fv,j
∂xi
(αl, αk), 1 ≤ k, l ≤ n.
Λ and Λ˜ are, respectively, the matrices of the components of semivalues ψn and ϕn
in the reference system {ψnαk}
n
k=1: Λ
t = (λ1 · · · λn), Λ˜
t = (λ˜1 · · · λ˜n).
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Proof We first prove that the allocations to the players according to a mixed
modified semivalue ψαkαl , 1 ≤ k, l ≤ n, can be obtained from the modified MLE:
(ψαkαl )i[v;B] =
∂fv,j
∂xi
(αl, αk), ∀i ∈ Bj . (9)
Let us suppose that fv = fv(x1, . . . , xn) is the MLE of game v ∈ GN ,
fv(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
Q⊆N
∏
u∈Q
xu
∏
u∈N\Q
(1− xu)v(Q).
Let Bt be a coalition block of B = {B1, . . . , Bm} with t ∈ M \ {j}, where M =
{1, . . . ,m} denotes the set of classes according to the coalition structure B.
If |Bt| = b, after applying rule (1) in Definition 5.1 to obtain the modified MLE of
coalition block Bj , fv,j , for each t ∈M \ {j}, three different types of products with
the variable yt can appear: (i) y
b
t , (ii) (1 − yt)
b and (iii) yct (1 − yt)
d with c + d = b
and 0 < c, d < b.
According to rule (2), products of type (i) are replaced with yt. For type (ii):
(1− yt)
b =
b∑
h=0
(
b
h
)
(−1)hyht = 1 +
b∑
h=1
(
b
h
)
(−1)hyht ;
replacing yht with yt for 1 ≤ h ≤ b, all these products reduce to
1 + yt
b∑
h=1
(
b
h
)
(−1)h = 1 + yt
[
− 1 +
b∑
h=0
(
b
h
)
(−1)h
]
= 1− yt.
Finally, the products of type (iii) vanish:
yct (1− yt)
d =
d∑
h=0
(
d
h
)
(−1)hyc+ht 99K yt
d∑
h=0
(
d
h
)
(−1)h = 0.
These considerations imply that in the modified MLE fv,j only appear coalitions
Q containing all elements of Bt or none of them. Thus, the coalitions Q with nonnull
coefficient in fv,j adopt the form
Q =
⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪ S with T ⊆M \ {j} and S ⊆ Bj .
Since the variables for players in block Bj does not change, the modified MLE of
coalition block Bj becomes
fv,j((xu)u∈Bj , (yt′)t′∈M\{j}) =
∑
S⊆Bj
∑
T⊆M\{j}
[ ∏
u∈S
xu
∏
u∈Bj\S
(1− xu)
∏
t′∈T
yt′
∏
t′∈M\(T∪{j})
(1− yt′)
]
v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪ S
)
.
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Differentiating with respect to variable xi, the marginal contributions of player i
appear:
∂fv,j
∂xi
((xu)u∈Bj , (yt′)t′∈M\{j}) =
∑
S⊆Bj\{i}
∑
T⊆M\{j}
[ ∏
u∈S
xu
∏
u∈Bj\(S∪{i})
(1− xu)
∏
t′∈T
yt′
∏
t′∈M\(T∪{j})
(1− yt′)
][
v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪ S ∪ {i}
)
− v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪ S
)]
.
Replacing each xu, u ∈ Bj , with αl and each yt′ , t
′ ∈M \ {j}, with αk, we obtain
∂fv,j
∂xi
(αl, αk) =
∑
S⊆Bj\{i}
∑
T⊆M\{j}
αsl (1− αl)
bj−s−1αtk(1− αk)
m−t−1
[
v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪ S ∪ {i}
)
− v
( ⋃
t′∈T
Bt′ ∪ S
)]
.
According to expression in Corollary 4.6, we conclude that the allocation to players
i in a coalition block Bj can be computed by means of formula (9), i.e.,
(ψαkαl )i[v;B] =
∂fv,j
∂xi
(αl, αk), ∀i ∈ Bj .
It only remains to prove the general expression (8) for any mixed modified semi-
value. The n2 mixed allocations (ψαkαl )i[v;B] with 1 ≤ k, l ≤ n form the elements
of matrix A(i). Since both semivalues ψn and ϕn are linear combinations of the
binomial semivalues in the reference system {ψnαk}
n
k=1, we can write for each player
i in coalition block Bj :
(ψn/ϕn)i[v;B] =
( n∑
k=1
λkψ
n
αk
/
n∑
l=1
λ˜lψ
n
αl
)
i
[v;B] =
n∑
k=1
n∑
l=1
λkλ˜l(ψ
αk
αl
)i[v;B]
from which
(ψn/ϕn)i[v;B] =
n∑
l=1
( n∑
k=1
λkakl(i)
)
λ˜l = Λ
tA(i) Λ˜ ∀i ∈ Bj . 
Once a reference system is chosen, a matrix summarizes the payoffs by any mixed
modified semivalue to each player, given both a game and a coalition structure.
Example 5.4 We return to game v in Example 3.6. Now, we consider the structure
of coalition blocks B = {B1, B2} with B1 = {1} and B2 = {2, 3, 4}.
From the MLE fv of game v,
fv(x1, x2, x3, x4) = 2x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + 2x1x2 + x1x3 + x1x4 + x2x3 + x2x4
− x1x2x3 − 2x1x2x4 + x1x2x3x4,
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we obtain the MLE related with the coalition block B2 applying rules (1) and (2)
according to Definition 5.1:
fv,2(x2, x3, x4, y1) = 2y1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + 2y1x2 + y1x3 + y1x4 + x2x3 + x2x4
− y1x2x3 − 2y1x2x4 + y1x2x3x4.
Then
∂fv,2
∂x2
(x2, x3, x4, y1) = 1 + 2y1 + x3 + x4 − y1x3 − 2y1x4 + y1x3x4 and
∂fv,2
∂x2
(αl, αk) = 1 + 2αk + 2αl − 3αkαl + αkα
2
l .
If we choose as reference system of semivalues on 4-person games {ψ40, ψ
4
1/3, ψ
4
2/3,
ψ41}, the matrix that summarizes all allocations by mixed modified semivalues to
player 2 is
A(2) =

1 5/3 7/3 3
5/3 55/27 67/27 3
7/3 65/27 71/27 3
3 25/9 25/9 3

For instance, if we want to use the 1/3-binomial semivalue on the modified quotient
and the Banzhaf value (coefficients of Bh4: p4s = 1/2
3, 1 ≤ s ≤ 4) within each
coalition block, the matrices of components are, respectively,
Λt = (0 1 0 0) Λ˜t =
1
16
(−1 9 9 −1)
and (
ψ41/3/Bh
4
)
2
[v;B] = ΛtA(2) Λ˜ =
9
4
.
Similar computations allow us to obtain the allocations to the remaining players.
For instance, for player 3, we consider again the MLE fv,2, but now we differentiate
with respect to variable x3.
∂fv,2
∂x3
(x2, x3, x4, y1) = 1 + y1 + x2 − y1x2 + y1x2x4;
∂fv,2
∂x3
(αl, αk) = 1 + αk + αl − αkαl + αkα
2
l .
In the same reference system {ψ40, ψ
4
1/3, ψ
4
2/3, ψ
4
1}, the matrix that summarizes
all allocations by mixed modified semivalues to player 3 is
A(3) =

1 4/3 5/3 2
4/3 43/27 52/27 7/3
5/3 50/27 59/27 8/3
2 19/9 22/9 3

from which (
ψ41/3/Bh
4
)
3
[v;B] = ΛtA(3) Λ˜ =
7
4
.
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For player 4, the matrix A(4) is obtained in a similar way from the MLE fv,2:
A(4) =

1 4/3 5/3 2
4/3 40/27 46/27 2
5/3 44/27 47/27 2
2 16/9 16/9 2
 .
Then, (
ψ41/3/Bh
4
)
4
[v;B] = ΛtA(4) Λ˜ =
19
12
.
On the other hand, to obtain allocations by mixed modified semivalues to player
1, we need the modified MLE fv,1 since player 1 belongs to coalition block B1.
Applying rule (1) in Definition 5.1 on MLE fv we have
2x1 + y2 + y2 + y2 + 2x1y2 + x1y2 + x1y2 + y
2
2 + y
2
2 − x1y
2
2 − 2x1y
2
2 + x1y
3
2
so that, after applying rule (2), we obtain
fv,1(x1, y2) = 2x1 + 5y2 + 2x1y2.
Differentiating with respect to variable x1 and using the reference system {ψ
4
0,
ψ41/3, ψ
4
2/3, ψ
4
1} we construct the matrix that summarizes all allocations by mixed
modified semivalues to player 1:
A(1) =

2 2 2 2
8/3 8/3 8/3 8/3
10/3 10/3 10/3 10/3
4 4 4 4
 .
Now, the allocation to player 1 can be obtained:(
ψ41/3/Bh
4
)
1
[v;B] = ΛtA(1) Λ˜ =
8
3
.
The mixed solution “1/3-binomial semivalue/Banzhaf value” for game v with
coalition structure B becomes
ψ41/3/Bh
4[v;B] =
( 8
3
,
9
4
,
7
4
,
19
12
)
.
Again, the mixed modified semivalue “Shapley/Shapley” is efficient, i.e., the coali-
tion value derived by Owen in 1977 (see [9]). For solution concepts without efficiency,
the utility distribution among the players is obtained according to the proportion
given by the allocation. In our example, the distribution of the total utility (9 units)
follows the proportion 32 : 27 : 21 : 19.
1/3-binomial semivalue/Banzhaf value −→ (2.91, 2.45, 1.91, 1.73)
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6 Concluding remark and extension
Although the semivalues form a wide family of solutions for cooperative games,
we have shown that, once a reference system of binomial semivalues is chosen, one
matrix summarizes the payoff by any semivalue to all players of a given game. The
harmonious relation between binomial semivalues and multilinear extension allows
us to obtain every allocation by semivalues from the multilinear extension, according
to Theorem 3.5.
A similar behavior is found when we consider solution concepts based on semi-
values for cooperative games with structure of coalition blocks. If we denote with
GN the set of cooperative games with finite set of players N and with BN the
set of all coalition structures in N , the mixed modified semivalues are solutions
Ψ : GN × BN → R
n obtained in two steps: (i) a modified quotient game where a
first (induced) semivalue acts, and (ii) a game played within the block containing a
given player where a second (induced) semivalue acts.
It has been proved in Section 5 that, once a reference system of binomial semi-
values is chosen, one (n×n)-matrix summarizes the payoff by any mixed modified
semivalue to each player of a given game with coalition structure, where n = |N |.
Now, the elements of these (n×n)-matrices are computed from a modified multilin-
ear extension related with each coalition block that it is derived from the multilinear
extension of each game according to the steps in Definition 5.1. Then, Theorem 5.3
shows that every allocation to a given player by mixed modified semivalues is ob-
tained by means of a product of three matrices:
(ψn/ϕn)i[v;B] = Λ
tA(i) Λ˜ ∀i ∈ N, (10)
where ψn is the semivalue that acts in the modified quotient game, ϕn the semivalue
that acts within the coalition blocks, A(i) the (n×n)-matrix related with the selected
reference system of binomial semivalues and Λ and Λ˜, respectively, the matrices of
the components of semivalues ψn and ϕn in the selected reference system.
According to formula 10, we can see that the computation of allocations by mixed
modified semivalues has two stages: (i) a fixed computation for obtaining matrices
A(i) related with each game and each coalition structure, and (ii) a variable com-
putation according to the selected semivalues ψn and ϕn, given by means of their
respective matrices of components Λ and Λ˜.
In our work we have always supposed that a unique semivalue acts within each
coalition block. It is not difficult to assume that different (induced) semivalues act
in this second level giving rise to a concept of generalized mixed modified semivalue.
More exactly, let us assume that B ∈ BN is a coalition structure with m coalition
blocks. If ψn, ϕn1 , . . . ,ϕ
n
m arem+1 semivalues in Sem(GN ), we define the generalized
mixed modified semivalue ψn/ϕn1 · · ·ϕ
n
m by(
ψn/ϕn1 · · ·ϕ
n
m
)
i
[v;B] =
(
ψn/ϕnj
)
i
[v;B] ∀i ∈ Bj (j = 1, . . . ,m).
This last expression can be computed by means of a product of three matrices
as in formula 10, where now the third matrix depends on each coalition block by
means of its respective semivalue.
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